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Abstract
In recent years academic interest in social movement learning (SML) has flour-
ished. Studies in the Education of Adults has arguably emerged as the premier 
international forum for exploring the links between adult learning and move-
ments for progressive change. In paralel to this subfield, yet largely in isolation 
from it, Studies has fostered the development of sociomaterial approaches to adult 
education and lifelong learning studies. These approaches reflect a wider trend in 
the social sciences and humanities towards what has been termed ‘new material-
ism’. In what folows, I develop SML theory by considering what such perspectives 
have to offer. Firstly, I explore the similarities and differences between so-caled 
new materialisms and historical materialism. Secondly, I explore what happens 
when social movement learning is redefined as sociomaterial movement learning. 
The final part addresses the ethico-political questions raised when SML is under-
stood in sociomaterial terms.
Keywords
social movement learning, historical materialism, new materialism, sociomaterial, 
post-humanism, social justice
Introduction
In recent years academic interest in social movement learning (SML) has flour-
ished. Studies in the Education of Adults has arguably emerged as the premier 
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international forum for exploring the links between adult learning and move-
ments for progressive change. In 2011 a special issue examined SML in a 
number of different countries and contexts: the Brazilian Landless Workers’ 
movement, Argentinian workers’ co-operatives, community organising of asy-
lum seekers and refugees in the UK and food-based movements, to name a 
few (Hal et al., 2011). Despite the diverse aims of these movements, each 
account of SML was united by the fact that it emerged from and informed col-
lective struggles to alter the material distribution of resources and risks. To 
paraphrase Marxist geographer David Harvey, struggles over rights and rec-
ognition mean nothing without the ability to concretise them in the material 
practices of daily life.
In paralel to this subfield, yet largely in isolation from it, Studies has 
provided a platform for the development of sociomaterial and post-human 
approaches to adult education and lifelong learning studies (for example Zukas, 
2009; Edwards, 2010; Fenwick, 2010). These approaches reflect a wider trend 
in the social sciences and humanities towards what has been termed ‘new 
materialism’ – a catch-al term for a nascent but undeniable intelectual move-
ment caling for a radical rethinking of ‘the nature of matter and the place of 
embodied humans within a material word’ (Coole and Frost, 2010a, p. 3). Given 
that much SML emerges from material struggle for a better world, it is surpris-
ing that there has been no systematic attempt to foster dialogue between the 
SML literature and sociomaterial interpretations of adult education and lifelong 
learning.
In attempting to open up such a dialogue, I firstly explain the sociomaterial 
approach and ask what is new about the so-caled new materialism that provides 
its wider intelectual context. Specificaly, I ask how new materialism differs from 
historical materialism. This is important because for many with an interest in 
SML, Marxian historical materialism is a significant theoretical base informing 
their understanding of both social movements and the character of learning they 
generate. Secondly, I explore the possibilities raised by reframing social move-
ment learning as sociomaterial movement learning. The principal task of this 
reframing is to interrogate the ‘social’ in ‘social movement’. In doing this, power 
and agency is displaced and distributed, so that that the entire notion of ‘colective 
learning’ is redefined to include non-human matter. Finaly, I pose some ethical 
questions resulting from such a perspective.
A caveat before I delve into the discussion: many of the points made herein 
could be more fuly developed. However, it is my intention to identify a 
number of salient points in order to resource what I see as a potentialy fruit-
ful dialogue. Relatedly, at the root of some of these debates lie difficult philo-
sophical concepts and their attendant vocabularies. Certain concepts wil be 
familiar to certain readers. In the spirit of this journal, I have tried to write as 
clearly and honestly as possible without losing what is important. However, 
to provide context and definition for everything would be impossible. As 
Edwards (2010, pp. 7–8) has argued, ‘there is a tendency in the discussion of 
lifelong learning, and in relation to education more generaly, to have to start 
from the beginning in everything that is written .. , placing constraints on 
experimentation’.
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Sociomaterial approaches and their new materialist underpinnings
Sociomaterial approaches to educational research draw from a dizzying array of 
disciplines and theories – ‘[actor-network theory] ANT .. posthumanism, material-
ist feminism, practice-based theories, spatial theory, non-representational theory 
and complexity theory’ – to give a non-exhaustive list of examples (Edwards and 
Fenwick, 2014, p. 2). The purpose of marshaling such an ensemble is, broadly 
speaking, to explore how matter matters, beyond what humans do with it, in edu-
cational contexts. Furthermore, Edwards and Fenwick (ibid.) contend that ‘matter 
and the material is framed within an alternative metaphysics to that of .. branches 
of Marxism’. This section engages with this alternative framing.
On my reading, Fenwick et al. (2011, p. 7) identify at least two common features 
uniting this ensemble under the banner ‘sociomaterial approaches’: 1) they are con-
cerned with the formation of complex systems and the processes of boundary mak-
ing that determine what is properly internal and external to any system; and 2) they 
‘trace interactions among non-human as wel as human’ components of systems.
The sociomaterial turn thus represents a post-human orientation. This is not an 
anti-human or dystopian orientation, but is more akin to what philosopher Todd 
May (2013, p. 11) cals ‘a-humanism’, which does not ‘displace’ the human so much 
as ‘dissolve’ it within heterogeneous material systems operating at the sub-human 
and supra-human levels.
What is important to note is that this turn is simply the educational manifesta-
tion of a resurgent interest in materialism across the humanities and social sci-
ences, which seeks to question the obvious coherence of the human subject and 
the human exceptionalism that it implies (c.f. Coole and Frost, 2010b; Dolphijn 
and van der Tuin, 2012). New materialism is concerned with ‘a raft of biopolitical 
and bioethical issues concerning the status of life and the human’ as wel as ‘the 
relationship between the material details of everyday life and broader geopolitical 
and socioeconomic structures’ (Coole and Frost, 2010a, p. 7).
Taken as a catch-al term, the locus of intervention in such post-human materi-
alisms is diverse: ‘for some it is about troubling the distinction between human and 
non-human animals .. , for others posthumanism is about seeing the technological 
as an extension of human objectivity .. , for stil others, posthumanism is about 
interrogating humanity’s role in environmental ethics’ (Chiew, 2014, p. 52). In fact, 
it is unsurprising that the notion of a post-human materialism has been most fuly 
developed as a concept through interdisciplinary work in the various ‘studies’ for-
mations – animal studies, critical science studies, disability studies, gender studies, 
post-colonial studies, race and ethnicity studies – devoted to addressing various 
modes of domination and control justified by humanist discourses that patrol the 
boundaries of who and what has historicaly been (dis)counted as human.
This has required an ontological reorientation fit for addressing such concerns 
(Coole and Frost, 2010a, p. 7). To express it plainly, this reorientation is:
post-structuralist ●
non-dialectical ●
non-anthropocentric ●
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Therefore, the first step wil be to explore how these distinguishing features 
separate new materialism from historical materialism. Before attending to this 
task, it is helpful to place the discussion in its necessary historical context. The 
neologism ‘new materialism’ partly arose as a political gesture by those who per-
ceived that poststructuralist and feminist philosophy has, over the years, been 
misrecognised as a linguistic enterprise concerned with textual hermeneutics and 
deconstruction to the detriment of addressing actualy existing material injustices 
(Alaimo and Heckman, 2008, p. 3; DeLanda, 2008, p. 160; van Tuin and Dolphijn, 
2012, p. 20; St Pierre, 2013, pp. 652–4).
This claim of misrecognition requires a little unpacking. The label ‘post-struc-
turalism’ denotes a critical engagement with structuralism. The basic structuralist 
‘position’ derives from a number of unavoidably abstract propositions to do with 
part-to-whole relations: firstly, every system has a structure (even if hidden from 
‘surface appearances’); secondly, the parts that make up any structure have no 
deep down ‘essence’ outside their relations to one another, which are determined 
by a larger whole; thirdly, structuralist analysis tends to abstract systems in order 
to analyse their relations as though frozen in time (Assiter, 1984, p. 275; Howarth, 
2000, pp. 26–8). For example, in the game of chess, the ‘agency’ of a rook is com-
pletely determined by its relations to other pieces within the rules and logic of the 
game. A key point is that these tenets have been applied not just to linguistics, 
but to mathematics, philosophy of science, biology, anthropology and sociology 
(Assiter, 1984, p. 273).
Therefore, on my reading, the new materialists would like to emphasise that 
post-structuralism sought to address the problem of how to account for change 
and historicity within structuralist accounts of ‘systems’, or ‘bodies’ whereby their 
component parts are reduced to ‘internal’ moments of a priori totalities (Howarth, 
2000; DeLanda, 2006; Chea, 2010). However, a ‘body’ here could be anything: 
‘an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a 
social body, a colectivity’ (Deleuze, 1988, p. 127). As abstract as it might sound, 
this involved attending to the role that external relations played in producing 
change within any structured system, which is always historicaly contingent and 
incomplete.
Although the genealogy of new materialism is too nuanced to do justice to 
here, the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza and Giles Deleuze either explicitly or 
implicitly provides the ontological grounding for much ‘new materialist’ or ‘socio-
material’ scholarship. In fact, Dolphijn and van der Tuin (2012, p.151) go so far as 
to claim that ‘Spinoza, and most of al the Spinoza of the Ethics, might very wel 
be considered the first (the foremost) new materialist’.
Spinozan philosophy is said to be ‘monistic’ in that it affirms the unity of being 
expressed in an infinite number of attributes. The ‘first principle’ is ‘a common 
plane of immanence on which al bodies, al minds, al individuals are situated’ 
(Deleuze, 1988, p. 122). In this framework, a body is not defined by its ‘organs’ 
and ‘functions’. Rather, these are the historicaly contingent results of kinetic and 
dynamic processes and the body is understood on these two axes (p. 123). On the 
kinetic axis, the body ‘is the relations of motion and rest, of slowness and speed’ 
of matter that determine its organs or functions. Intensive properties, then, are 
those such as speed, temperature, pressure and so on, which drive flows and 
processes and at critical thresholds produce spontaneous qualitative change. In 
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other words, the actualised qualities of any complex system arise through inten-
sive processes.
On the dynamic axis, a body is defined by its capacities to affect and be 
affected by other bodies. What can it do when thrown into external relations with 
other bodies? (ibid.). Three important concepts folow from Spinozan thought, 
which underpin sociomaterial thinking. Firstly, no foundational distinction is 
made between artifice/nature, human/non-human since distinctions between 
bodies are analysable in terms of kinetic and dynamic differences between inter-
related matter (ibid.).
Secondly, this leads to an affirmative theory of difference understood on its 
own terms, so to speak. That is, difference is not derivative of a larger identity to 
which a body ‘belongs’. For the reader unacquainted with Spinoza and Deleuze, I 
ask that you accept that this concept, although eliptical, is foundational. Since it is 
foundational, I have to touch upon it, despite offering very little explication. Since 
the unity of al matter can give rise to a potentialy infinite number of modes, dif-
ference is singular and prior to representation. In this view, negation is ‘not the 
motor’, but rather ‘negation arises in the wake of affirmation’ of singular differ-
ence (Deleuze, 2009 [1968], p. 67). Negation only becomes possible when, rather 
than understanding the body as an intensive and dynamic process, the ‘abstract 
idea’ takes over, and relations are understood in the context of ‘an essential trait 
while disregarding the others (man as an animal of erect stature, an animal that 
laughs, that speaks, a featherless biped, etc.)’ (Deleuze, 1988, p. 45).
Third, the Spinozan distinction between ethics and morality is significant. New 
materialists and sociomaterial educationalists are al indebted to the Spinozan 
idea that the ‘good’ for a body is that which increases its capacities to affect and 
be affected and what is ‘bad’ is that which decreases its capacities to affect and 
be affected. This means that ‘an act is bad when it directly decomposes a relation, 
whereas it is good whenever it directly compounds its relations with other rela-
tions’ (p. 35). One wel-worn example is that of poisoning, where a poison joins 
with the blood in order to cause it to enter into ‘relations that characterise other 
bodies (it is no longer blood)’ (ibid.). The relations between the poison and the 
blood may ‘agree’ in that they compound to make something new, but the act is 
‘bad’ for the poisoned person in that it decreases her ability to affect/be affected. 
I wil ask some questions of this view in the final section.
Overal, the simultaneously political and ontological gesture of this Spinozan–
Deleuzian position is to provide an account of the synthesis of the properties of 
any system or whole in order to show that other worlds are always possible, since 
‘you do not know beforehand what a body or a mind can do, in a given encounter, 
a given arrangement, a given combination’ (p. 125). This moves us beyond what 
materialist philosopher DeLanda (2006) cals ‘organismic metaphors’, where the 
component parts of wholes (think of organs in a body) are only understood in 
terms of their relation as parts of the functioning totality. In this conception of 
wholes, relationships are ‘logicaly necessary’, which is why it is possible for dia-
lectical materialists to think of differences as contradictions (unities of opposites), 
and not just as differences.
This latter understanding of difference is exemplified in SML studies by 
Marxists such as John Holst, who reasons that the task of education in the context 
of social movements of the urban poor, the dispossessed, the global precariat, is 
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to move from an ‘objectively revolutionary’ situation, to one in which people sur-
plus to the requirements of capitalism move to a state of ‘subjective’ recognition of 
their situation. Holst’s SML theory is a good example of the idea of the internality 
of relations at work:
When we think .. in terms of internal relations, one can see how the existence of oppres-
sor classes and nations is incumbent upon the existence of oppressed classes and 
nations; one pole of the dialectic cannot exist without the other (Holst, 2011, p. 123).
In this conception, the act of learning is necessary dialectical, in that difference 
must emerge through negativity and is thus subordinated to the identity of the 
whole. By contrast, new materialists take the position that what appear as discrete 
elements are actualy emergent properties. In this view, the actual properties of 
any system or whole are inhabited by a virtual capacity to be destabilised through 
external relations with other systems or wholes. By virtual, is meant a space of 
possibilities at any given moment that is real but not actual (DeLanda, 2006).
The most popular political exposition of this view, in relation to Holst’s discus-
sion of the global precariat, is found in Hardt and Negri’s concepts of Empire and 
Multitude, where the global disenfranchised ‘Multitude’ and the diffuse global 
power of ‘Empire’ are not a dialectical unity of opposites at al. In their view, 
‘rather than seeking the kind of guarantees that (even the appearance of) unity 
provides, we should emphasise the risks, uncertainties and possibilities of our 
situation’ (Hardt and Negri, in Brown and Szeman, 2005, p. 381). This, in turn, 
leads to a very different conception of what SML in and against ‘Empire’ might 
look like: much more provisional and experimental but also seemingly more il-
defined. More on this later.
So far, I have conveyed the view that the ‘newness’ of new materialism was 
partly a political and rhetorical gesture. I have also touched upon its poststruc-
turalist foundations. Yet, I stil find myself asking, is this reason enough to dis-
tinguish it from the de facto ‘old’ ‘dialectical’, or ‘historical’ materialism? This not 
to be resolved here, but I can touch on two pertinent points to resource further 
dialogue.
If historical materialism understands material reality to be ‘dialectical’, it 1. 
should be noted that there are at least two quite distinct understandings of 
dialectics.
The degree of attention given to the agency of non-human things-in-them-2. 
selves may be the only thing that truly sets ‘historical materialism’ and ‘new 
materialism’ apart.
In my experience, the phrase ‘dialectical’ is often used without a clear shared 
understanding of its different uses and meanings in a way which hinders dia-
logue. Dialectic can refer to: 1) thinking of relation and difference in terms of 
contraries and contradictions ‘recuperated’ or ‘sublated’ in a final unity; 2) simply 
a relational understanding of al material reality (Hardt and Negri, in Brown and 
Szeman, 2005, p. 381; Bryant, 2011, p. 75). I have touched on the former under-
standing of dialectics but not the latter.
The best exposition of the latter position that I have come across to date is 
from Marxist geographer David Harvey (1996), and it is hard not to be struck 
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by its proximity to new materialism and the sociomaterial. Harvey (1996, p. 50)
states that, ‘[t]hings are internaly heterogeneous at every level .. [and] there is no 
‘basement’ to experience’. For Harvey (ibid.), dialectical reason is underpinned 
by a ‘deep ontological principle’ that ‘elements, things, structures, and systems 
do not exist outside of, or prior to the processes, flows, and relations that create, 
sustain, or undermine them’. Historical materialism understood in this way is 
what new materialists refer to as process ontology. It should be noted that process 
ontology − the notion that ‘beings do not pre-exist their relatings’ − has also been 
cited as a foundational principle by new materialist thinkers (Dolphijn and van 
der Tuin, 2012, pp. 161–4). The result is that historical materialism understood 
this way (Harvey, 1996, p. 48; Gramsci, 2011 [1930–32], p. 190) and new mate-
rialism (Dolphijn and van der Tuin, 2012c, p. 48) both espouse an ontology in 
which mind/matter, nature/culture, theory/practice, subject/object dualisms have 
no purchase.
However, my own reading suggests a genuine ambiguity here. On the one 
hand, new materialists reject the concept of negation in dialectical thinking, argu-
ing that a ‘monist’ metaphysics implies an ‘affirmative politics’; a rethinking of 
critique as a process of ‘responsible experimentation’ through which newness 
emerges (Latour, 2004, p. 248; Braidotti, 2013, p. 13; Edwards, 2010, p. 10). In 
other words, critique must ‘work through practices’ rather than being a mere 
‘unveiling of power relations’ (Edwards and Fenwick, 2014, p. 3). I find it reason-
able to suggest that a point of dialogue might be to ask how this differs from the 
Marxist concept of praxis. In any case, this view relies on understanding dialectics 
in the first sense and in ignoring the second. In doing so it seems to foreclose the 
possibility of a deeper engagement with historical materialism.
On the other hand, even a proponent par excelence of the second understand-
ing of dialectics such as David Harvey, fals back on contradiction and negation 
as the motor of change. Like the new materialists (Latour, 2004, p. 244; Dolphijn 
and van der Tuin, 2012, p. 90), Harvey (1996) draws on the process philosophy of 
Alfred North Whitehead in his expositions of Marx’s dialectical thought. In fact, by 
the publication of 2006’s Limits to Capital, he ‘increasingly see[s] Marx as a magis-
terial exponent of a process-based philosophy rather than a mere practitioner .. of 
Hegel’s logic’ (p. xv). In fact, by 2010 Harvey (2010, p. 128) likens Marx’s under-
standing of capitalism to a ‘socio-ecological totality’ − what the philosopher Giles 
Deleuze cals ‘an “assemblage” of elements’, composed of relations that are ‘fluid 
and open, even as they are inextricably interwoven with each other’.
The issue is that in the next breath, he reaffirms his belief that the dynamics 
between parts and whole must be understood through the contradictions gener-
ated (ironicaly contradicting the singular purpose of Deleuze’s project as laid 
out in Difference and Repetition (2009 [1968]). This is made possible, in essence, 
by abstracting any emergent totality from its external relations in order to then 
analyse the mutualy constitutive relations between the parts and said totality. In 
other words, in order to attend to the permanencies of lived experience, one needs 
to form closed systems in order that any experimental activity is inteligible.
For example, in Harvey’s latest book Seventeen Contradictions (2014, p. 7) he 
abstracts capital accumulation from the wider system of capitalism (understood 
by him as the ‘social formation in which processes of capital circulation and 
accumulation are hegemonic’) in order to understand its own specific ‘internal 
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contradictions’ such as use-value/exchange value. One who has read Harvey’s ele-
gant accounts of such dynamics can attest to their seductive explanatory power. 
And it is the lack of wilingness to engage with a daily experience seemingly 
teeming with ‘violent contradictions’ that brings critics of new materialism to 
accuse it of being ‘political ineffectual’ holism (Braidotti, 2013, p. 55). Historical 
materialists, such as Harvey, would therefore presumably argue that what is under 
emphasised in the monistic new materialism are the powers enacted through 
enduring assemblages. However, the question remains whether dialectical contra-
diction and negation furnishes us with an adequate basis for understanding ‘mor-
phogenesis’ (understood as the birth of form, irrespective of whether the entity in 
question is geological, biological, linguistic, political and so on), or whether it is 
an a priori mode of thought superimposed onto it.
If, for argument’s sake, we can find some reconciliation between historical 
materialism and new materialism in their adherence to process ontology, such a 
view guards against attributing misplaced concreteness to that which is produced 
through flux, flow and relation. Thus, in historical materialism, as in new materi-
alism, the critical gesture lies in demonstrating that what appears to be concrete 
and given is the result of contingent relational processes that might have been, 
and could be, otherwise. For example, the critique of commodity fetishism rests 
on the idea that a material commodity is in fact the product of historicaly specific 
networks of dynamic social relations.
However, there is an important difference. As Harvey (2006, p. xx) is at pains 
to point out, ‘Marx held (somewhat surprisingly) that value is objective but imma-
terial’, and consequently it ‘hides its relationality within the fetishism of commodi-
ties’. I think that this curious statement is key to understanding the difference 
between these two perspectives. It means that value in historical materialism 
is completely contingent upon social relations of power between humans and 
that this fact is hidden from us when faced with the material products of labour, 
assigned exchange-values. Harvey (ibid.) argues that the ‘history’ in historical 
materialism is concerned with social relations of power, which are not directly 
measurable and therefore require representation in the money form, which alows 
the private accumulation of social power. This focus, he contends, is what distin-
guishes it from natural materialism.
This brings me to the final point in this section. What does it mean to claim 
that immaterial social relations produce objective effects? What is the ‘social’? On 
this point, proponents of sociomaterial approaches to education turn to Latour 
(2005, p. 68), who argues for a shift in thinking from a ‘sociology of the social’, 
to a ‘sociology of associations’, in which ‘society’ is replaced by ‘colective’, under-
stood as an ecology of human and non-human ‘actants’. Relatedly, the sociomate-
rial theorists turn to Jane Bennett’s (2010) argument for reconsidering ‘publics’ as 
‘agentic assemblages’ in which ‘vibrant materialities’ − including various forms 
of non-organic matter − ‘participate’. Bennett (p. 2010, p. 99) argues that a meas-
ure of anthropomorphism is necessary in order to counter anthropocentrism. In 
other words, highlighting ‘thing power’ is a device which might be used to ‘cata-
lyse a sensibility that finds the world filed .. with various materialities that form 
confederations’.
Thus, what realy seems to set new materialism and the attendant sociomate-
rial turn in education apart from historical materialism is that it takes seriously 
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the proposition that non-human matter has agency, in a manner of speaking. 
Fenwick and Edwards (2013, p. 50) argue that this key difference is evident in 
various forms of education for social justice, where ‘what is material is often 
taken to be the background context against which human educational practice 
takes place or within which it sits, and material tools are often taken to be simply 
tools that humans use or objects they investigate’. This sociomaterial approach is 
fundamentaly different than asking how technological developments, processes 
of geographical development and spatial arrangements contingently shape social 
relations, otherwise there would be no difference from historical materialism, 
which has always attended to such dynamics. Rather, it does away with the rei-
fied generality ‘social’ altogether (Edwards, 2010, p. 9). This poses two questions. 
Firstly, how does this help us theorise SML? Secondly, ‘[w]hat does education for 
equity and justice look like if we approach it as vital materiality?’ (Fenwick and 
Edwards, 2013, p. 58). It is to these questions I now turn.
Sociomaterial movement learning?
Edwards (2010, p. 13) has suggested that a post-human conception of lifelong 
learning would ‘position learning as a gathering of the human and non-human 
in responsible experimentation’. This section interrogates this claim more closely 
in the context of SML. In the most general sense, it is common to understand 
social movements as sustained processes of colective action undertaken by net-
works, or aliances, of heterogeneous individuals and groups, in opposition to 
some aspects of the status quo. The ‘movement’ component of ‘social movement’ 
is entirely compatible with sociomaterial analysis, since in process ontology any 
entity is a singular and ephemeral event. ‘Movement’ connotes the dynamic capac-
ity to affect and be affected.
However, since there are many species of colective action, what distinguishes 
a movement from, say, anomic protest or a mere coalition, is the process of ‘colec-
tive learning’ involving the development of colective identity, guided by ‘norms of 
social justice’ (a shared worldview), a sense of ‘solidarity’ and knowledge pertain-
ing to the mobilisation of material and cognitive resources (Kilgore, 1999). In this 
conception, the ‘colective’ in question is a gathering of humans. After al, in what 
meaningful way can non-human things exist in ‘solidarity’ with humans?
On the other hand, sociomaterial movement learning would conceive of the 
‘colective’ in this ‘colective learning’ as inclusive of the non-human ‘actants’, 
which enable such practical ‘social’ activity. To replace ‘social movement’ with 
the term ‘sociomaterial movement’ acts as a critical gesture with the intention 
of flagging up the extent to which the immateriality of the ‘social’ in historical 
materialism operates as a reified generality, which does not explain, but requires 
explanation.
The idea of a society has become in the hands of later-day ‘social explainers’ like a 
big container ship which no inspector is permited to board and which alows social 
scientists to smuggle goods across national borders without having to submit to public 
inspection (Latour, 2005, p. 68).
Latour is not saying that large emergent entities are fantasies. He is, in effect, 
saying at every turn you must ‘show your work’ and dispense with al reified 
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generalities. He finds it ‘absurd that we recognise two different kinds of reality: 
one for hard scientific fact and one for arbitrary social power’ (Harman, 2009, 
p. 22). Al forms of power require complex chains of mediation at every turn and 
since, for him, everything exists on the same ‘metaphysical footing’, any conceiva-
ble ‘thing’ – a placard, a pen, a shoe, a bicycle chain, a cinema ticket, a hedgehog – 
that ‘modifies a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor – or, if it has no 
figuration yet, an actant’ (Latour, 2005, p. 71). As a result, the act of sociomaterial 
movement learning rather than social movement learning would always be partly 
an act of what is termed translation. Since knowledge emerges through chains of 
mediation (books, databases, flipcharts, rooms, tablets, fibre optic cables, and so 
on), the mediating objects are properly constitutive of the learning event.
Why might this be useful to understanding contemporary SML? Firstly, the col-
lective learning generated through movements such as Occupy, Los Indignados 
and the Slum/Shack Dwelers International is not explained by social ties or forces, 
but rather these social ties or forces are made possible through multiple acts 
of translation between megaphones, occupied places, fibre optic cables, mobile 
devices and so on. Secondly, ‘things’ and ‘spaces’ can be imagined as having 
their own affective capacities that generate certain regimes of attraction operating 
beyond human intentionality. Thirdly, dispensing with the notion that humans 
act/behave and the rest of the world (the environment) is acted/behaved upon, 
should result in more thoughtful and modest interventions and experiments that 
council against the valourisation of the enemy as wel as colective action against 
the enemy. In other words, it is difficult to occupy, protest or take direct action 
against an abstraction.
Having struggled to find examples from the SML literature with which to popu-
late this discussion, three folow. McFarlane (2009; 2011) studies the Slum/Shack 
Dwelers International (SDI) as a ‘learning movement’ based on the translocal 
exchange of ‘knowledge, ideas, materials, practices’ across sites (2009, p. 561). 
Key to McFarlane’s account of the learning taking place is the sociomaterial con-
cept of ‘translation’, which emphasises ‘the agentic capacities of materials in pro-
ducing knowledge and learning’ (ibid.). In paying attention to ‘who or what has 
the capacity to assemble’ (p. 567), McFarlane is attentive to both the translating 
role of charismatic ‘middle-class activists .. with formal educational attainments’ 
as wel as ‘ful-size model houses’ that are exhibited in places such as the lobby of 
the UN in New York, in order to ‘hijack a middle-class activity’, ‘generate discus-
sions over land tenure to construction’ and ‘put the capacities and the skils of the 
poor on public demonstration’ (p. 563). The point being that these model houses 
are as much influential actants as the middle-class activists. McFarlane (2011, 
p. 368) also recounts how urban activists from the SDI utilised railway tickets, 
wires and stones in order to manipulate phone networks in Mumbai, thereby 
gaining free access to coordinate their actions and blocking the phones of minis-
ters when organising protests. For McFarlane, the improvised systems of tickets, 
wires, stones, as wel as the phone networks themselves, were constitutive of 
tactical movement learning.
The second example focuses on the administrative practices of a social move-
ment organisation caled the Tibet Support Group (TSG) (Davies, 2011). Davies’s 
ethnographic account focuses on the ‘temperamental’ office franking machine 
‘at the centre of an assemblage of individuals with the requisite skils to make it 
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work’ (p. 279). He highlights how the machine as an actant plays an important 
translating role essential in sending mailshots and so on, so that the wider public 
learns about their campaigning activity (ibid.).
The third example focuses on an act of student protest, namely locking the 
university gate as post-human learning’ (Zielinska et al., 2011, p. 255). The par-
ticipant-authors described direct action triggered by the erection of fencing at the 
University of Gdańsk, which particular student-activists interpreted as an attempt 
to transform the university into a gated community. As the fencing was under 
construction during a university open day, activists locked the gate of the fence, 
thus ‘forcing masses of people coming from trams to look for gaps in the stil 
unfinished structure’ (p. 256). The authors assert that the ‘experiment’ gathered 
‘people and things together’ – ‘students, activists, surveilance cameras, the ban-
ner, leaflets, the gate and so on – into a ‘colective’, thereby convincing ‘the gate to 
play an active role’ and caling people to learn without their consent’ (ibid.).
For me, these ‘micro’ examples of sociomaterial movement learning provoke 
an important question: why do we have to assert the agency of objects in order 
to appreciate their necessary material role in learning processes? Moreover, is this 
not al a little parochial and banal? Traditionaly, the learning that social move-
ments generate has been understood to be about what Paulo Freire (1972) caled 
‘ontological vocation’: that is, social movements through their praxis ask the big 
awkward questions about what it is to be human. However, these ontological 
questions are about being as human, not being as such (Bryant, 2011, p. 35).
What is to be gained from this ontological wrangling about being as such? One 
reason that sociomaterial thinkers such as Bryant (ibid.) claim is because effective 
learning in social movements surely relies on a sound understanding of being as 
such, and how it structures the realm of the possible. Alowing for speculation, 
historical materialists might suggest that the Gramscian notion of an analysis of 
the balance of forces between coercive material and juridical power in political 
society and cultural power in civil society ‘has this covered’. However, it is highly 
doubtful that Gramsci seriously considered the agency of objects.
Yet al of this begs that question hinted at in the first section of this article: 
namely, is the only alternative to ineffectively directing our ire at big abstractions 
(capitalism, neoliberalism, climate change and so on) colapsing al analytical dis-
tinctions? Historical materialists would argue that the ‘countless stale dualisms’ − 
nature/culture, local/global, society/technology, society/space − that sociomaterial 
thinkers cast ‘by the wayside’ (Harman, 2009, p. 66), are analyticaly necessary in 
order to demystify the various hybrid webs in which we are entangled. For exam-
ple, radical geographers such as Doreen Massey, David Harvey and Ed Soja use 
the concept of ‘socio-spatial dialectic’ to describe situations where a number of 
individual ‘socialy’ planned spatial arrangements end up being thrown together 
in ways that exceed their original intentions, generating emergent ‘spatial’ proper-
ties that in turn create unexpected social uses of urban space.
The ambivalence of this sociomaterial approach of ontological flatness is high-
lighted by historical materialists who are frustrated at the seeming ignorance towards 
the ways in which a Marxist analysis of fetishism reveals how technologies are the 
product of exploitative social relations (for example Hornborg, 2014, p. 130):
Every ‘technological’ solution is ultimately a social relation in the sense that it wil have 
implications for the societal distribution of the burden of problem-solving. The car or 
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computer that may save its owner time represents losses of time for the myriad workers 
(such as in mines or oil fields) whose congealed labour it represents. Moreover, to the 
extent that modern technologies make possible a more efficient use of urban or agri-
cultural space, for those segments of global society who can afford it, it is important to 
consider that they may represent losses of natural space (such as for strip mines or oil 
fields) elsewhere on the planet.
Anticipating such critique, sociomaterial thinkers return to the fray with the notion 
of sociomaterial movement learning as a process of responsible experimentation 
(Edwards and Fenwick, 2014). Critique, they submit after Latour, has ‘run out of 
steam’ (ibid.). ‘Educational and social researchers’, they argue, ‘have worked very 
hard to reveal the machinations of capitalism’, but have ‘more or less successfuly 
avoided changing the existing reproductions of power and inequalities despite 
these critiques’ (p. 4). Instead, Latour and his educational exegetes seek to rein-
vigorate the notion of critique as affirmative; as assemblage; as ‘tracing lines of 
possibilities’ (p. 18), through engaging in a ‘rhizomatic’ micropolitics, to speak 
with Deleuze and Guattari. Since − to return to the Spinozan roots of the conversa-
tion (see first section) − we never know in advance what ‘bodies’ are capable of, 
learning as an experimental encounter is unpredictable. In the words of Deleuze 
(2009 [1968], p. 241), ‘learning’, if it is to be worthy of the name ‘tears us apart’ 
and ‘demands the very transformation of our body and our language’.
Of course, this conception of colective learning through experimental mic-
ropolitical practices is not at al a foreign concept to contemporary activism. 
For example, Scott-Cato and Hilier (2010) analyse the learning of the Transition 
Towns movement in precisely this way. The Transition Towns movement, as they 
explain, is premised on community micropolitics as a response to the failure of 
‘macro’ politics to tackle the twin realities of climate change and peak oil. A prin-
cipal of the cultural politics of the movement is that colective learning and ‘social 
innovation’ doesn’t emerge through negation (protesting ‘against’), but through 
affirmative and open translocal social experiments; multiple loosely networked 
assemblages, through which successful innovation spreads ‘rhizomaticaly’ (ibid.). 
For example, as Scott-Cato and Hilier write (p. 878):
Akin to Deleuzian ‘minor politics’.. a favourite method of the Transition movement 
is Open Space (htp:/www.openspaceworld.org/), where the agenda for a day-long 
meeting is set by those who arrive in the morning and there is a harsh Darwinism in 
the choice of discussions, because people move from one person’s discussion group to 
another if they feel their energy flagging.
In fact, it barely needs pointing out that the concepts of ‘open space’and ‘horizon-
tal’ organising are key tenets of many contemporar y movements, both communit y-
based and direct action-based. However,this is where I become ambivalent about 
sociomaterial rhetoric. In folowing chains of translation and mediation between 
objects we never leave the local level. This at times brings some sociomaterial 
analysis close to arguments for expunging the notion of scale from politics alto-
gether and reifying certain other spatial master concepts such as ‘flatness’, ‘open 
space’, ‘rhizomatic’, and ‘horizontal’. There are two main issues with this.
Firstly, these spatial tropes act as ideal images to live up to and present to the 
wider world. However, there is a recognised gap between rhetoric and reality 
07_CalumMcGregor.indd  222 10/21/2014  10:13:03 AM
From social movement learning to sociomaterial movement learning? 223
here. For example, Castels (2012, p. 223) argued that Occupy represented a 
‘parenthesis’ in the rhythms of capital accumulation experienced in daily life. 
Within this parenthesis, responsible experiments and gatherings no doubt gener-
ated sociomaterial movement learning. However, many people by virtue of their 
life circumstances were structuraly excluded from such practices. This is a prob-
lem, since ‘the only politicaly correct form of organisation in many radical circles 
is non-state, non-hierarchical and horizontal’ (Harvey, 2012, p. 69). A politicaly 
naïve voluntarism lies behind this orthodoxy.
The second related issue is that, in my view, I agree with Harvey (ibid.) that 
the only way to address this is to reintroduce an analysis of spatial and temporal 
scale. Feasible ways of organising in order to manage a commons at one scale, 
for example managing local water resources through direct democracy, are not 
necessary feasible at another, such as climate change politics. However, if we 
understand scale in terms of increasing complexity (assemblages of assemblages 
of assemblages ..) rather than ‘size’, as DeLanda (2006) does, then there need not 
be any incommensurability between the new materialists and the historical mate-
rialists on this matter.
In this section, I have discussed the idea of sociomaterial movement learning. 
I concede that there is value in insisting on ‘bottom-up’ morphogenetic accounts 
that don’t introduce reified generalities that require explanation, rather than 
explaining. However, I also recognise the need for analytical distinctions and sca-
lar analysis in order to devise effective strategy, even if they are heuristic. To me, 
there is a danger of labouring the point to the extent that we come close to deny-
ing large-scale emergent entities that are objectively real but somewhat beyond 
our immediate experience. Moving on to the final section, I would like to touch 
upon the ethical dimensions of this interpretation of SML as an unpredictable 
experimental activity that asserts the quasi-agency of ‘things’.
Sociomaterial justice?
It stil remains to answer the question ‘[w]hat does .. equity and justice look like 
if we approach it as vital materiality?’ (Fenwick and Edwards, 2013, p. 58). It is to 
such issues I now turn. Fenwick and Edwards (2013, p. 58) argue that the ‘point is 
not to banish human meanings, subjectivities, desires, values and so forth .. .When 
agency is understood as a distributed effect produced in material webs of human 
and non-human assemblages, some argue that a more responsible, ecological poli-
tics is possible’ (p. 58). To understand this, we must ret ur n to the Spinozan concept 
of ethics, which indeed provided a source of inspiration for deep ecologists such 
as Arne Naess. What is good is the event through which bodies ‘can compound 
directly to form a new, more extensive relation’ and a more ‘intense capacity or 
power’ (Deleuze, 1988, p. 126). Responsibility then becomes, after Karen Barad, 
‘respons-ability’, designating the ‘possibilities of mutual response’ (Dolphijn and 
van der Tuin, 2012, p. 55).
However, since this view necessitates a certain relinquishing of control, it is 
important to be aware that the new materialist reading of Spinoza is idiosyn-
cratic. Given the complexity of the world and the encounters that constitute it, 
almost any event wil be both good and bad in the Spinozan sense. It has been 
argued by scholars of Spinoza that since ‘bodies’, ‘colectives’, ‘confederations’, 
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and ‘assemblages’ continualy experience states of being drawn to a simultaneous 
‘increase and a diminution’ of powers, that the result is a kind of entropic ‘sad 
destiny of the passions’ (Macherey, 1996, p. 155). In other words, Spinoza can 
be interpreted as a theorist of alienation rather than agency. The problem is one 
of distinguishing, adjudicating and establishing relevant justice relations. Since 
Spinozan ethics are completely at odds with heroic accounts of human agency, 
the political application of it, as seen in Hardt and Negri’s (2006) self-organising 
Multitude, has been critiqued for the failure of its wooly messianic rhetoric to 
provide any feasible basis for political strategy (for example Laclau, 2005, p. 243; 
Mouffe, 2005, p. 107–10). In fact, Hardt and Negri’s interlocutors have proposed 
the political necessity of the idea of the unitary political subject, even if it can 
never be achieved. For example, Brown and Szeman (2006, p. 381) draw an anal-
ogy between the mind and political assemblages: they argue that although the 
unified Cartesian subject is an ilusion produced by a brain with no centre of 
command, the mind ‘ilusion’ is stil functionaly necessary. In the same way they 
ask, is it not so that colective identity is necessary for the objective, if decentred, 
function of any political body?
Regarding the ‘non-human’ more specificaly, Bennett (2010, p. 109) predicts 
that limiting the notion of a ‘public’ and the ‘good life’ to the human wil soon 
seem as ‘extravagant as when the Founding Fathers denied slaves and women the 
vote’. But how far are we wiling to go and what connections matter? Through 
what calculus might we be able to identify the appropriate locus of intervention 
in a world where any object is equal in principal but not in fact. Can this be any-
thing more than a huge overstatement? If the difference between a movement and 
anomic protest is the solidarity generated through colective learning, can there 
be any such thing as democratic reciprocity or solidarity between humans and 
other configurations of organic and non-organic matter?
On this last question, sociomaterial theorists Fenwick et al. (2010, p. 175) cite 
approvingly Bennett’s (2010, p. 107) encounter with political theorist Rancière 
and his distinction between the police order and the political moment. So let us 
briefly engage with this encounter. Rancière understood the police order to be 
‘an order of bodies that defines the alocation of ways of doing, ways of being, 
and ways of saying, and that sees that those bodies are assigned by name to 
a particular place and task’ (1999, p. 29). A political act is one which disrupts 
or interrupts the police order. The realm of institutional politics in this view 
is entirely of the police order, while the ‘political’ is characterised by sporadic 
interventions that test the boundaries of police order. A political agent is then ‘an 
operator that connects and disconnects different areas, regions, identities, func-
tions, and capacities existing .. in the nexus of distributions of the police order’ 
(p. 40). So far, so sociomaterial. And this is what prompts Bennett (2010, p. 107) 
to ask what stops us from considering any material object that fulfils these func-
tions as a political agent.
But can we define solidarity as the coming together of disparate elements into 
an assemblage and leave it as that? This creative use of Rancière runs counter 
to his very specific suggestion that political solidarity requires a presupposition 
of equality based on the mutual recognition of ability to apply higher cognitive 
function to engage in decision making, debate, take account of our surroundings 
and act in a coordinated fashion as a result (May, 2013, p. 15). There may be, for 
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example, a degree of social solidarity between humans and other species based 
on mutual dependence and shared experience, but there is no political solidarity 
(ibid.). Moreover, there is no solidarity whatsoever between humans and non-
organic matter beyond an anthropomorphic metaphor. It is not clear to me that 
post-human materialism and the concept of political solidarity can co-exist.
Ultimately, for historical materialists, it may be that the provocative inver-
sion of fetishism and the notion of ‘response-ability’ goes too far by obfuscating 
social responsibility. It may be that these postures have generated the sense 
that there is a lack of shared politics between those interested in SML and the 
new materialism. It may be such a lack that has prevented dialogues, like this 
one, from taking place to date. For my part, I reserve my right to ambivalence; I 
am ‘stil confused but on a higher level’, as the saying goes. I merely hope that 
this three-part conversation – 1) comparing historical and new materialism; 2) 
trying to sketch out the idea of sociomaterial movement learning; and 3) posing 
some ethical questions − does its job, even if clumsily, by generating further 
dialogue.
I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for the chalenging yet 
encouraging comments on an earlier draft of this paper. They have helped me to 
make the necessary improvements to both its content and expression.
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